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Young Children's Discourse
and the Origins of the World:
A Reading of Essences
by
David Kennedy

The Transformation into Text
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But when you get these pictures from outer space [he holds them up) you
suddenly notice that the earth seems to be alive . I mean, I'm not sure
what I mean by "alive" .
The earth is alive.
Well, look at it--if you look at this picture, and if you look at that
picture up there, you definitely get the sense that there's something
sort of . . .
Living. Alive. Moving.
. . . together about it, isn't there? And so-And it's floating up in space . . . and going down all the way through
space with . . . with kinda rocket shoes . . . or that's also invisible
. . . or that also's a head with two eyes and a smile.
Well, what I wanted to ask you about was where . . . what about the
origins of this thing that we live on--where does it come from?
I've got a question.
We're alive. Is it alive? And if it's not alive, how does it bring
forth the life that we are?
I have a question.
O.K. Does it have to do with what we're talking about?
Yes it does.
He's a hairy monster.
Well, the earth is a round ball, and, and it always goes round and
round the sun . . . and if it got closer it would be a different color,
like it would turn green or something.
Closer to what?
Or yellow or red?
The sun.
So you're saying that its color and everything depend on its distance
from the sun . That's a very good point.
Yah, and if it got so, so very close, very close that it could turn up
into ashes, um . . . I would think it would turn orange, I guess.
Well then you're saying that it comes from the sun? • • . Or . . .
you're not saying that.
I'm not saying that.
O.K. But I'm saying: where does it come from?
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It comes from . . . Well, it comes from-Burning gas.
Burning gas?
Well, I think-No it doesn't come from burning gas! Neither does the earth!
Well let's let him say it, and then you can respond to it.
The sun is burning gas. But . . .
Oh. The sun is burning gas.
But how, how does the . . . the
• um, gas get on the sun?
How did the gas get on the sun?
I can tell you.
I thought you said the sun was--is burning gas?
Cause the gas tank can't get blowed up in space or spray it on it.
[laughs] No!
Um, I've got a question.
. I've got another one to answer his.
O.K. Let's not . . . Let's let everybody get a chance to talk who
wants to, though, Sara.
I think uh . . . I think uh
. the uh . . . burning gas is in space
. • . and I think that's why [over-ruling denial] .
and I think
that's why we have space shuttles so they won't get gas in their.
[inaudible].
[almost whispering] There's no burning gas up in space! The stars are
gas.
The stars are what?
And they're burning real real hot.
The stars are burning? That's why they're bright?
Um, yah. Um, you know what? If they went outside in space, uh . . .
they would burn up.
Uh uh!
But some astronauts got out of their space shuttle and didn't burn up.
Of course they had those •
incredible suits on.
Yah, those metal suits.
[competition from three or four for the floor]
David! I have a real important question.
[Alan still talking about metal]
O.K. Let's wait and make sure we have order • . . Since it's so
important.
Order in the court.
Yes, that's right. Order in the court. O.K. Let's let Penny talk and
then Sara give her really important question.

Nine five and six year olds are sitting in a circle on a thick rug at a
kindergarten daycare center in a small college town in Kentucky. They are talking about the earth and space. They have been led into the subject by their
teacher, who is acting as a moderator, attempting--at least at the most ostensible level--to enforce the fundamental rules of an egalitarian model of
discourse.
The tape recorder is running. The teacher is working at very close
quarters--restating, extending, repairing broken connections in the conversation,
which is proceeding with the passionate, tumultuous intensity typical of this
small group of young children. Already, in the first few minutes, the conversation has heated up to a near-chaos of sudden insights and bold theoretical
sweeps flung partially and inarticulately forth, dramatic changes of subject,
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interruptions, arguments, bids for authority, expressions of biting rivalry,
raucous word and idea play; and, lurking under it, always--for the teacher at
least--the spectre of its dissolution in a welter of hilarity, acrimony, or some
combination of the two.
The tape recorder was, in the heat of this event, the only representative
of its future transformation into text. Now here, later, after painstaking
transcription, the text has completely replaced the event. The transformation
into text has not abstracted the event: Sara's searing energy is still present
to me--in fact, more quintessentially so--and Nathan's driving, inquisitive
style still shines through to any reader who allows the text to work in him or
her. The text has not so much abstracted as universalized the event. Its form
of displacement reveals the universal in the concrete, but not apart from the
concrete. The text in its thusness, its thrown givenness, maintains that
paradoxical nature of the hermeneutical circle, its tension of the circumscribed
and the limitless, which never allows more than its facticity and contingency
warrant, and yet always demands recognition of the universal meanings hidden in
its concreteness. Merleau-Ponty expressed this with typical elliptical clarity:
"We must . . . become aware of this paradox--that we never free ourselves from
the particular except by taking over a situation that is all at once, and
inseparably, both limitation and access to the universal" (1964, p. 82). The
text reveals how every lived event is an evocation of totality in the playing
out of the multiple, the emergence of "a spontaneous order, a meaning, an intrinsic truth" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 52) at the very heart of the contingent.
For the teacher of the young child, who so often struggles for order among
persons who at times seem to exemplify the extreme and unreflective drivenness
of fear and desire, the text is revelatory almost to the point of magic. What
struggling teacher can see, except in incoherent glimpses or rare, special
moments, the deep reason operating in this event, except in its transformation
into text?
Lineaments of the Text: Discourse, Narrative, and Essence

I want to distinguish roughly between three kinds of young children's discourse in educational settings. On one end of a continuum there is school
discourse in its classical form. Its major characteristic is an order imposed
by a central adult authority, around whose cues topic initiation and maintenance,
turn-taking conventions, speaker-listener interchanges, and conversational repair
are practiced and internalized. This sort of discourse, as quasi-formal and
unique as it is, can be studied linguistically: that is, the larger exchange
patterns of the ordered classroom can be interpreted as events with the same
sort of structural characteristics as phonemes, words, phrases, and sentences
(Willes, 1983; Ripich &Spinelli, 1985).
On the other end of the continuum is the discourse of children left to
themselves--the language of dramatic play, of the playground, of groups sitting
around without a teacher--or we may even say, groups "out of control" in a
classroom setting. This is a discourse much more difficult to capture in its
structural patterns, given its wildly playful modalities. It is the sort of
language event whose inner logic tends to be hidden in apparent randomness or
chaos, rather than self-consciously imposed, as in teacher-led discourse.
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The text here under interrogation is an example of a third . sort, and it falls
somewhere between these poles. It is not didactic discourse or spontaneous
(un-adult-erated) discourse, but what may in a loose sense be called philosophical discourse. It lacks the most obvious elements of didactic discourse, which
is the "cue-bid-nomination" move, that is, the call for an answer to a question,
a raised hand, and the bestowal on the one cued of the right to speak (Willes,
1983, pp. 70-72, 100). In this case I did not insist on bids, but acted as
arbiter of turn disputes, maintainer of topic across turns, and initiator of
conversational repairs when necessary--i.e., as moderator. This is not to say
that strong elements of both didactic and spontaneous discourse did not assert
themselves periodically; in fact those moments when they did are very much part
of the overall texture of the discourse-event.
This particular approach seems to lead to a form of discourse which displays
a high and tumultuous tension. It is arguable that didactic discourse is simply
an artifact of this same tension in a state of formal suppression, and that
spontaneous child discourse displays this tension-ridden structure most manifestly. The sources of tension are, significantly enough, the same ones that very
often make philosophical discourse a difficult form for adults. For one, the
children's thinking moves much faster than the discourse rules usually allow,
making connections and associations, finding relations, and negating or affirming
a previous point. Second, the elements of simultaneity, playfulness, and emer· gence which, I will argue below, are essential to the event, tend to contravene
ordered discourse. Then there is the young child's unfamiliarity with the "rules
of the game," combined with chronically low impulse control, and the ineradicable
element of competition for scarce resources (the resources here being the attention of the whole group), with which are associated--in what causal constellation is not entirely clear--ideological conflicts and struggles between
individuals and even subgroups. These, too, are typical elements of adult
discourse of this sort, although among adults they are sublimated, concealed,
denied, or expressed with more sophistication.
In order to question the text further, it is necessary to pass beyond the
comfortably reduced level of discourse analysis--that micro-world where language
forms are deliberately "stopped," or made opaque. What--beneath, among, between,
included in the tumultuous order of the discourse patterns--what larger patterns
reveal themselves? Clearly, a story is telling itself. Actually it is a story
about a story, a meta-narrative. It is the story of an argument about world
view, and about knowledge--about how one can know the "true" story, and in what
sort of informational form it consists. This is what makes it philosophical.
Narrative can be, and has been, starting at least with Propp (1968),
included in the linguistic methodological continuum upon which we have already
placed discourse. "Language," as Willes says, "is a patterned activity at every
level of its organization" (1983, p. 88), and this ranges from phoneme to narrative form. As such, the text is clearly available to a structuralist interpretation. We find . it, in fact, "telling" not only its own story, but the role and
function of its participants. As Joana said in a follow-up session (if with a
different trope), "We're a story. He's [God is] telling the story."
But one can go even deeper into the text. There are modal patterns operating even beyond narrative. These patterns are also language, but they are
unspeakable--at least from a diacritical, structuralist point of view.
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At these deeper levels the text can be read off, or "played," in more than
one way, for the text in its textuality is a cosmos, a self-contained field of
relations which can be taken as a whole in this way or that. But in holding
oneself open to what reveals itself in the interconnected field of the text,
there is for each interpreter that which, as Heidegger described it, "is not to
be gotten around," i.e., "that which in the fullness of its coming to presence
they [the sciences] can never encompass by means of their representing" (1977b,
pp. 174, 175-176). "That which cannot be gotten around" means: that which cannot be absorbed into our systematic interpretive structures; cannot be "enframed"
(p. 19) in regions delineated in advance, since i t is a dimension of the ground
of those regions. It can only be described as a phenomenon, after (or inextricably bound up with) the fact, rather than explained. It can only be "beheld"-theorein (pp. 163-165)--with the passionate, contemplative interest of the
philosopher, rather than the predicting, controlling interest of the social
scientist/educator.
Essence is ·~ot simply . . . what something is, but . . . further, the way
in which something pursues its course, the way in which it remains in time as
what it is" (Heidegger, 1977b, p. 3). Essences are irreducible features of
meaning which are inexhaustibly present in lived experience. They leave their
traces in the text like photographic patterns of shadow and light. They are
ciphers of what Heidegger called "world" (1962, pp. 102-107). World is always
already there, and is therefore unavailable to any ultimately reflective act.
In fact, world's essentiality enters reflection, as a rule, only with a "reversal
of consciousness," only when something goes wrong, when the tool breaks (Heidegger, 1964, p. 105), with "continually false generalizations being refuted by
experience, and what was regarded as typical being shown not to be so" (Gadamer,
1975, p. 316).
In this case, the text itself is the moment of negativity which opens our
insight into world, even as it fragments and obscures its original lived quality
by reconstructing it in another dimension. Here, the text is the break in the
uncapturable everydayness of things. The essences are only glimpsed within it:
it only carries their traces. They are not, after all, entities, but forms of
relation in time. "The essence of an experience is always a certain modality of
our relation to the world" (Merleau-Ponty, 1964, p. 62).
Further, "reading" these essences is a form of relation as well--a kind of
relation with the text called "interpretation." And not only that, but in this
particular case the interpreter finds himself in the text ("D.K.") in a central
and unescapable way. Here, each act of reflection on the text is an act of
reflection on self as well: on one's irremediable influence, for good or for
ill, in the field of the text, on one's own perilously fallible practice, and on
the crucial tension between social role (teacher) and individual identity (me)-i.e., fate and freedom--that the text throws into dramatic relief for each
participant, oneself included.
Finally, the essences which become available--whose traces surface like
fragments of a secret code--do not directly inform practice in the sense of
providing me with a new technique with which to return to other such discussions. Rather, seeing the essences contributes to the deconstruction of the
very notion of a technical approach. I return from the text to lived experience
with a greater capacity to wait, to listen, to position myself for the emergence
of the essential significance of all experience. I return more convinced than
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ever of the reason hidden in everything, which reveals itself when I allow
myself "to be conducted by the object" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 330). When this
dialectic has its way, one can only act maieutically, like a midwife, which is
a sort of active non-action, a determination to be present to something which is
unfolding into presence from somewhere beyond any one participant, in the presencing which is the event. Here, any skill resembles an absence, or a kind of
stillness, rather than a positive technique.
I return to lived experience with groups of young children aware that they
too--as deeply vulnerable as they are to the chaos, the discord, the absence of
meaning which threaten their life together--are caught up in a conversation t hat
speaks to them, although it in no way enslaves them. I mean that their conversations are, as discourse, narrative, and essence, as deeply meaningful as any
adult's, when looked at phenomenologically; perhaps more meaningful, because
young children are paradigmatically naked of either subterfuge or technique, and
so the real themes emerge, and it is possible to see the "logic of question and
answer" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 340) at work in an exemplary way in their conversation.
Readings

Penny:
D.K.:

Sara:
D.K.:

Sara:
Penny:
Brad:
Alan:
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Nathan:
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The earth is just a ball.
Just a ball.
Yah, but not a bouncing ball.
Not a bouncing ball.
Just a hard kind of rock ball.
Yah.
Or a basketball. [laughs}
[Nathan starts making loud bounaing noises}
A basketball player couldn't throw the earth.
A basketball player couldn't throw the earth? But when you say "just a
ball," I'm not sure what the "just" means.
Well . .
It's not just a ball.
[joking} It's just a basketball.
Well let's let Penny explain, O.K.?
It's sort of like a ball.
It's not completely round, but it's almost round.
Yah.
O.K.
It's not a square or triangle.
[Brad is giggling and joking about the "earth as basketball" notion to
Peter, who is sitting next to him}
But I'm particularly interested, Brad-It is a triangle!
No it's not it's a rect--it's a circle! Silly!
Or a sphere.
But I'm . . . I'm thinking of a force field.
A force field?
Yah, you know-Gravity is around the earth.
And you know, a space ship goes through a force field.
Hey, if we have gravity here, it would go in s-pa.ae and have gravity.
[-pa.use}
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Yahl
Yah l See, if gravity is here . . .
Yah, on the earth.
It would go in space.
Oh. Because the earth is in space?
Yah.
Yah.
If it comes down here it would just start to float and go up to the
earth.
I would think of float I wonder what it feels like floatin'.
Feels like a ghost.
It must be pretty neat, huh?
[over other voice s ] Yah 'cause then you can push yourself down, and then
when you hit the floor then you go whoop! like a bouncing ball.
I wish I could fly like a bird.
'Cause in space you don't have any gravity, and, um, in your space ship,
and you go whoooop! Start to float up.
And if you did have gravity you'd just stay on the ground, and some
people, Pat told us, in this book, people they wanted to take a trip to
the sun, but it would take, guess how many years?
Two hundred.
Four hundred.
Two hundred and fifty-three years, and about nine hundred and sixtyeight months.
Wow.
And it's take-And it would take two Christmases . . .
Oh, wow !
And it would take until the next winter and the next spring and the next
summer and the next fall.
Uh huh.
And it-Uh uh ! The next Christmas.
Yah. Two-- two Christmases.
No. Only one Christmas.
O.K.
One . One Christmas.
Anna, did you want to say something, or . . . O.K . . . . Now, Sara had
a very important question, but before she says it, if she remembers it
I do.
O.K. Before she says it, my very important question is, what . . . I
have two very important questions, as usual . . . One question is, what,
where does this thing [indicates globe] , this "just a ball" floating in
space with gravity, with water on it, with plant life, with human life,
with animal life . . . where does this thing come from?
From . . . earth.
Earth comes from earth?
[chorus o f "No !" and "From God!" ]
What comes from earth?
The ball.
Hey, who made God?
Earth comes from God?
Nobody made God.
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[three people talking at once about God and earth}
What's wrong with you people?
Something's wrong with you, Sara.
[general silliness}
Let's talk one at a time . . . . Anna?
The world was being just a snowball, and then God • . . then God or
Jesus made colors and turned it into a world.
It was just a snowball . . . . You mean cold?
Yahl
A dirty snowball! [joke}
It was a cold-Dirty snowball.
--dirty pack of something?
[general tittering}
[laughing} Cold! Snowball!
Brad? Brad! Don't go past that, O.K.? . . . Brad! We are having a
discussion. It's not a joke session . . . . Brad!
[D.K. does not perceive Brad as responding to his 1,xwning. Meanwhile,
Anna is explaining, "It z.x:zs made like that." J
Oh! David! Were the dinosaurs-fin a lower voice, to Brad} Time out.
The dinosaurs were-/to Brad} Time out.
[to Brad} Time out.
David! Hey, were the dinosaurs born from that • . • Then it froze.
Can I come back when you're done?
[D.K. nods assent}
Then it froze up. The ball froze up, when the dinosaurs.
When they were born? Why do you say that?
Um . . . because . . . because people say-That's not true that they said .
in the comet . . . they said that
the comet was the one who killed the dinosaurs . . . you're telling a
wrong thing.
Na-uh!
[with pronounced disdain} Well, if the comet was a dirty snowball, so
a dirty snowball hit a dinosaur?
[after a slight pause} My Mom and Dad might can see it, and I can't.
O.K. Let's let Nathan finish his thought here.
They say, um, the snowball . . . um . . . the dinosaurs froze • . . on
the . . . this earth.
O.K. So-[with sarcasm} Earth. This earth.
The world.
So you're making a connection between this frozen thing that Anna said,
about the snowball
. the frozen thing and the end of the dinosaurs
. . . the death of the dinosaurs.
Yah. That killed the . . . . It killed 'em. It killed 'em.
[three or four struggling to get the floor}
O.K. But let's let Peter speak to that, or to something.
Um, when the dinosaurs were born, the comet did not come just then.
I know, and-They lived for a lot of years and then the . . . whatever it's called
come by.
Were there men and women around then?
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{a shouting match of "yes" and "no." Mostly "no."]
{loudly] Only cavemen!
Eg--the Egypts!
The Egypts were around during dinosaur time?
No no! That's all wrong!
No it's not!
Yes it is! There was lava back then!
Cavemen!
The Indians came!
No!
The Indians came after.
The Indians came after the dinosaurs.
Yah.
And then the people came.
You mean the Egypts.
Yah the Egypts were the first people
{drowning her out] Then the Indians, then the . . . lifetime.
Then the what?
Lifetime.
Dinosaurs.
Cavemen, then Egypts were the first ones that were made.
Oh, us you mean.
Yah. Then came dinosaurs, then came, uh . . . then came-The dinosaurs, then the Egypts . . .
Then came, uh . . . then came . . .
were first. We heard that on TV.
. . . uh, Indians. Then . . . then came people.
Yah.
Oh, you mean Indians aren't people?
Yes they are!
{ many shouted "yes!" J
They're a different race of people.
Yah.
Races. Oh you mean there were different races?
Yah. And us was after the dinosaurs I think . . . . Us was after the
dinosaurs.
No!
O.K. What-No we weren't!
Yes we were!
What-No we weren't!
Uh huh!
Yes we were!
I said we were Indians before.
{a chorus of conflicting claims emerges: "Yes we were!" versus "No we
weren't!" It becomes a rhythmic, antiphonal chant, four against four,
steady but not shouting. Sara, who began it, is leading the stronger
"No."]
{shouting] You mean you're a hundred years old?
Yes we was!
What then was before the dinosaurs?
{a pause]
I think--

Sara:
Peter:
D.K.:

I got it I got it!
Uh, just dragonflies.
Dragonflies?
{uncertain [XJ.USe ]

Thinking in Complexes

The conversation is above all an event of collective language. In collective language events, structural and formal aspects tend to take priority over
substantive and thematic ones. The patterning is aesthetic, concrete, and
complexive, rather than abstract and superordinative.
Furthermore, there is a kind of discourse, a narrative domain which defines
the t opos of the conversation for everyone involved--in this case, the "story of
how things work . " One wonders, it is true, whether this particular narrative
structure would have survived long without my strategic restatements. But once
in place, the "how things work" discourse calls forth characteristic responses,
and calls on certain kinds of sources of, and authorities for, information.
Meanwhile , the event moves through a dizzying series of associations, bumped from
theme to theme by the evocation of images between the interlocutors, as well as
the mutua l "calling up" of complexive pools of information.
At the beginning, Anna--who tends to be in control of her sources--quickly
summarizes "alive" notions: "Living. Alive. Moving." Alan, always the
visionary dreamer, immediately flashes to the "alive" consciousness of the
animator, and sees the earth as a cartoon character, with "rocket shoes . . . two
eyes and a smile." Nathan associates to a "hairy monster," a notion he doesn't
have a chance to develop because his arch-rival (for this conversation anyway),
Sara, moves on to the sun's relationship to the earth.
Sara does this, I think, because she knows that the sun has something to do
with keeping the earth "alive . " I try to connect it with the origins theme, but
Nathan jumps to the origins/composition of the sun: "Burni ng gas." Then the
confusion about the meaning of "gas" (gasoline) leads to near-insuperable difficulties, which are almost cleared up by Peter, when Penny (who, as shown late r ,
has a relatively low tolerance for ambiguity) breaks again with, "The earth is
just a ball." She seems to be telling the boys: it's not a cartoon character,
burning gasoline, or anything else. It's just what the globe shows it to be.
It's just a ball.
Then, there is the complexive chain: ball--snowball--dirty snowball-Halley's Comet (then much in the news)--the theory of the extinction of the
dinosaurs by cold--cavemen--Indians--Egyptians--dragonflies. That is, the tail
of Halley's Comet was then being referred to as a dirty snowball, and the comEit
was associated with ancient, ageless phenomena, and therefore origins, because
it only comes around every so many years, more than a lifetime . Dinosaurs are
associated with the origins of the earth, and their demise with cold snow, and
they also were around a long time ago, as were the "Egypts," the cavemen, and the
Indians.
We have moved quickly and effortlessly from a "how things work" narrative
to one of its subsets- - "how and in what order things came to be." That, anyway,
is what the teacher seems to be after. And there are elements which go with that
narrative. They emerge effortlessly, but wi thout explicit superordinative
21

organizers (though the unconscious presence of the latter is implied) like the
found pieces of a broken-up puzzle. Being isolated but somehow connected, they
are stated both absolutely, in that there is an intuitive certainty that each one
fits somewhere in this narrative; and provisionally, in that their place in the
story must be negotiated through the collective language event. Adults call it
"brainstorming," or "creative thinking," but it is just how five-year-olds talk
and think.
It is, as termed in Vygotsky's penetrating description of young children's
thought, a thinking in "complexes" rather than "concepts." He says: "While a
concept groups according to one attribute, the bonds relating the elements of a
complex may be as diverse as the contacts and relationships of the elements are
in reality" (1962, p. 62). But in fact there i s a unifying attribute, which is
"story," in this case the story of the True Account of the Origins, Causes, and
Development of All Things, which is the story that science and certain kinds of
philosophy (the kind, indeed, that led to science) is always telling. It is
within this particular narrative trope that the complexes emerge.
Simultaneity

In the collective language event, everything happens at once. Language is
linear and sequential only when it is stopped in the (adult) rituals of selfcontrol, of which printed language is the final exemplar. The event here under
discussion, for example, was not fully recorded or transcribed. In order to have
done so, a state-of-the-art voice microphone would have had to be attached to
each child, and the constant interruptions and cases of more than one person
talking at once somehow translated into print. Even then the text could never
more than hint at the event's lived quality--especially the vivid, crucial
presence of what Ricoeur (1976) calls "mimicry and gesture. 11 1
The direction of all our conversation, its telos, is this simultaneity
experienced as communion. "To reach an understanding with one's partner in a
dialogue is not merely a matter of total self-expression and the successful
assertion of one's point of view, but a transformation into a communion, in
which we do not remain what we were" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 341). Language guides
sequentially and linearly on one level--question/answer/assertion/negation/
question, and so forth. On the other hand, young children talking show how we
cannot possibly contain or arrange discursively the wealth of association,
sudden insight, and total affirmation or rejection that is experienced moment ous ly
--as a shared moment--in conversation. The collective language event carries us
out of ourselves, "we do not remain what we were," and in it our thought is
happening together at once, as it is both created by the interplay of our language, and creates that language from its own deep sources.
In this, language and thought are simply seeking their common ontological
ground. But the movement of events is dialectical, while the lived experience
is synchronistic and simultaneous. This tension of the one and the many embodied
in the collective language event can become almost unbearable. The event in its
historical and propositional significance emerges in time: certain developments
lead to other developments which could not have been predicted, and cast meaning
back on the original developments. This is the dialectic. But within this
linear, temporal perspective we are also "one body," members of a cosmos that
speaks, and the sense of atemporal communion which this occasions eventually
breaks into play, which is its ritualization. Only ritual--the antiphonal chorus,
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for example, of page 20--can express such intensity of atmosphere.
takes over altogether, in Dionysian s i multaneity.

Then language

If it were not for the adult, the passage into ritual play would here have
probably been followed by the dissolution of the language event. D.K. steers
out of it on page 17 ("It's just a basketball"), and later actually flatly
banishes a member for a time.2 Otherwise, things would likely have peaked in
humor, then fallen apart, perhaps to regroup, perhaps to shift altogether--in a
rush for the play-yard, for example. This poses questions about the inherent
tensions of the pedagogical relationship. Without the grouchy, repetitive, limiting, demanding adult, the conversation would never last. Yet in seeking the
point where it explodes in hilarity, the conversation is only seeking to express
its lived ground, which is the event of communion--of wordplay, of laughter,
song, dance, wrestling (lovemaking).
Dammed off as it is from its ground, the conversation becomes theatre.
Sara (the dominator) and Nathan (the i nnovator) struggle for power, while
authority that comes with having some command of the scientific knowledge base
is established in Peter, and Anna balances accounts judiciously and thoughtfully.
Penny's passionate convict i ons, her intense desire for closure, will eventually
carry her to the point of self-contradiction. Alan dreams whimsically, while
Joana's emerges as a gnomic, poet/seer's voice. Each of these personal giftings
is cast dramatically as a mythic role, thus transforming discourse into drama.
In drama, the participants are caught up in a significance of which they are a
part, yet which transcends them- - which speaks through them, even as they struggle
to speak it.
D.K.:
Peter:
D.K.:
Penny:
Sara:
D.K.:
Sara:
D.K.:
Nathan:
Sara:
Peter:
Sara:
Nathan:
D.K.:
Anna:
Nathan:
Anna:
Nathan:
Anna:
D.K.:
Sara:
D.K.:

O.K., Sara, what then was before the dinosaurs? And what even before
then? I mean what about • . • thi s thing?
[indiaate s globe in middle of airale]
No one knows.
No one knows?
Yah-I know I know I know!
You know?
I'm the bookworm.
You're the bookworm, so you know? [Sara nods, but says nothing] O.K.
Anna?
Ahhh! You're not the bookworm!
Well .
You don't have every book in the whole wide world.
Well, I at least have one of . . . the [inaudibl e ]
. Um-Then you have to have every one of them.
Why don't you let Anna say, and then you think of what you're going to
say. O.K., Anna.
When the dinosaurs were alive, Egypts and cavemen-Cavemen was after. Cavemen.
. . . and Indians were alive. And-I think cavemen---and dinosaurs killed some of the Egypts. Heard that on the news.
You heard that on the news? [over inter rupti ons] Well then what came
. . . what was before the di nosaurs?
I know!
Before the Egypts?
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Sara:
D.K.:
Anna:
D.K.:
Sara:
D.K.:
Sara:
Peter:
Anna:
Sara:
Peter:
Anna:
D.K.:
Anna:
D.K.:
Peter:
D.K.:
Nathan:
Peter:
D.K.:
D.K.:
Sara:
D.K.:
Sara:

Penny:
D.K.:
Peter:
D.K.:
Nathan:
Penny:
Nathan:

I got it I got it I got it I got it!
Before the Indians?
I don't know I don't know.
You don't know? O.K. Do you think it's known?
I do!
Do you think people know? Does somebody know?
I do! I do!
It's in a book.
The oldest person-I know.
It was dinosaurs.
--who was about to die knows.
Was about to . . .
Die, is about to die. Because he was the oldest one. I think that's
true: the oldest.
I see. O.K. Sara, she says that the oldest person would know the
ans--Peter , I think, is saying
[turning to Peter}. Did you say
that somebody knew too?
Yah. [indicating a book in his hand}
That it's in a book?
[s houting} It's God! God's know e-- God-This book. Here's a book for you.
There's a book called Giant Dinosaurs. So can this book tell us what
was before dinosaurs?
[a chorus o f "Yah l"}
But Anna says that the oldest person in the world knows the answer to
the origins of the earth!
I know one answer I know it!
Of life!
I do know it! I have this book called Danny and t he Dinosaur and it
told me that, well, dinosaurs couldn't come alive. The people, they
found bones, and they found their skin with the bones, and they put the
bones together, and put skin on them, and I didn't really believe that,
but anyway, it wasn't true, it was just a story, well, it might have
been real, I don't know. But anyway, Danny, he went--the dinosaur was
real, and he played like he had one outside but he really didn't have
one, but he pretended like the dinosaur came alive, but dinosaurs can't
do that when they're a hundred years old.
!fi ve full seconds of silence}
f i n a l ow voice } I don't believe this.
Why not, Penny?
When do we get to go outside?
Why don't you believe this?
I'm gettin' tired of this.
'Cause I don't believe anything, about if that's true.
God--God just knows everything.

Playfulness

If there is any one overriding paradigm for the "universality of the lived
event," it is play. We become players when we give ourselves to the play of the
presencing which is the event in its unfolding. The textualization of the lived
event helps us to see the larger patterns at play in it--although we can never
see them except in frozen sections, like stopped action in a photograph, which
evokes movement yet is still.
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Play is the universal quality of event in two ways: both the activity of
the "playing out" of roles and narrative patterns that always transcend the
participants, a being caught up in the fateful play of the world which the event
is; and the particular re-presentation--the "play" in the sense of the dramatic
narrative as a whole--which the playing out accomplishes. The young child is a
sort of unconscious master of both these aspects of the lived event.
In this text, the child's play is, both because of its subject matter and
because of its mediation by an adult (i.e., its pedagogical nature), primarily
agon , or contest. Play as contest is intrinsically bound up with festival/rit e
(Huizinga, 1955, pp. 30-31), of which the collective language event is one form.
The text shows each child being transformed, in the passionate, precipitous
intensity of the event, into an element of meaning in a larger, complex, multiple
relation. We sense destiny in the playing out of each role. We know that Sara 's
overpowering drive for performance and attention will mark her whole life,
whether in its present, naked form, or transformed into a form of wisdom by
experience. The event "plays" Sara like an instrument: in her rivalry with
Nathan, in her passionate determination to beat what she perceives as the
teacher's game ("I know I know I know I know!"), Sara is expressed by the event.
She is carried out of herself, and in the play of festival/contest, becomes both
what is particularly meaningful about herself--her very essential, unique,
concrete personality--and a universal human type, one part-of-speech in the
involuntary grammatical patterning of the lived event.
What is true for each individual participant in the agon is true for the
event as a whole: in all the concrete particularity of the to and fro motion of
the interplay of the players, a universal story emerges, of which the event is a
dramatization. Each participant is caught up in the story which is telling
itself, as, for example, the great tragedies tell themselves. And what is
telling itself here is a story about a crisis in belief systems. The text may
be read as the script of a play about world view, about authoritative knowledge
(what one can know, and how), about ideological conflict within a culture, about
God and Satan.
The young child's enactment of this script reveals the playfulness of existence itself. Plato's dialogues--the paradigmatic models of philosophical
discourse--reveal this as well, but not with the raw immediacy of young children,
for whom to live is to play, and whose very artlessness allows the essentiality
of the playful to be glimpsed before its appropriation by tradition, world view,
or sheer technique.
Emergence

What gives the play its peculiar urgency is an essential relation between
speech and thought. The festival event of collective language is a poetic event,
in the Ricouerian sense that it is an event of "being becoming aware of itself"
through the emergence of "the enigma of novel meaning beyond the bounds of previously established rules" (Ricoeur, 1977, p. 302). Nathan is stunned by his own
brainstorms; they emerge from a dimension of his understanding over which he has
little control. Nathan discovers himself saying things.
"Thought tends towards expression as towards its completion" (Merleau-Ponty,
1962, p. 177). And in the collective language event, expression calls out
expression. The emergent meaning is always a greater meaning, a whole whose
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parts can be what they are only in relationship to all the other parts. The
many thinkers are operating involuntarily as one thinker expressing itself. In
the dialectic to which the speakers have given themselves, one thing is saying
itself through the participation of each. This one thing is what Ricoeur calls
"the truth of meaning . " "Being," he says, "feels itself a spontaneous and
inexhaustible source of transcendence towards the truth of meaning through the
workings of expression" (1978, p. 253).
The truth of meaning is not a statement or series of statements which
correspond to sense-reality, or any set of logical entailments. The truth of
meaning is dynamic and emergent, a polysernous order in which a surplus of significance haunts thought. The order of meaning siezes these young children, and they
are cast as dramatic actors in the play which is its self-representation.
Part of the drarna--in fact what gives it its particular poignancy, and
characterizes it as hurnan--is the sense of danger, of anxiety at the possibility
of un truth which the dialectic of indivi dual and collective, finite and nonfinite, evokes. The participants are always, in fear and compelling desire,
missing the mark: trying to make finite, personal, and certain the truth of
meaning by having it before it emerges, or having it all to themselves, or
cutting off further emergence . They are beset by the basic anxiety of beings
who know transcendence yet are in time. But the order of meaning is present
only in what Merleau-Ponty called the paro le parlant which, "like a wave, gathers
and poises itself to hurtle beyond its own limits" (1962, p. 197); which is never
complete, is always corning into being, is always evoking a totality which flees
on too close an approach.
Nathan:
Penny:
Peter :
Anna:
D.K.:

Peter:
Penny:
Peter:
Anna:
Peter:
D.K.:

Peter:
Penny:
Peter:
Penny:
D.K.:

Peter:
Penny:
D.K.:

Nathan:
Peter:
Nathan:
D.K. :
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God--God just knows everything.
Yah, yah, God knows when the earth comes . . . God made the earth. He
knows everything . • . [i naudib l e ]
[soorn f ul ly ] Hey!
And too Jesus also.
Jesus also.
Hey !
Jesus-But the earth was there before.
He made it!
What were the dinosaurs on if there wasn't the earth?
[a olamor of s houted oorronents]
Let's let Peter talk.
There wasn't earth, what was the dinosaurs on?
He knows when the dinosaurs came and when the dinosaurs died, and when
the Egypts came and when the cave men came . • . and the Indians.
The . . . cave men came before the Indians.
He knows when all that came.
Who?
How do you know?
God.
God? Is that what you're saying?
Then why do we know their names?
Well if Jesus was born on the earth, how could he make the earth if he
was born on it?
But, how did we know his name?
Jesus, the name.

Nathan:
Joana:
D.K.:
Nathan:
Joana:
Penny:
Sara:
Anna:
Joana:
D.K.:
Joana:
D. K.:
Joana:
Penny:
Penny:
Sara:
Joana:
D.K.:
Sara:
D.K.:
Penny:
Peter:
Anna:
Joana:
Penny:
D. K.:
Anna:
Joana:

Yah, his name and God's name. Why we--how did we know thei r names?
'Cause God told us.
'Cause God told us.
Oh, that's what--but did we see God? Noooo!
[ chorus o f "no " J
I seen God.
We've never seen God.
Where did you see him?
My mother told me-A church.
A church.
And I believe him.
And you believe him.
Yes.
I don't believe in a God.
[general aff irmations or denia ls of be l ie f ]
No, I do not believe in him .
I said every prayer last night and I couldn't.
And I talk to God and he talks to me.
[to Sara } Why?
I don't know . . . • 'Cause my dog is dead and I like him. It was a her
and her name was Hobbit, and she looked so much like Toto.
[picking up on Peter 's f lung comment} And Peter says he doesn't believe
in God and it's only a story?
Yah, it's only a . . . it's only a fake!
It's only a story about God making the earth. It's not true.
Uh uh uh !
God did make the earth.
[genera l controvers y]
Yahl It's only a fake!
And he says that the earth has been here forever, but-It is not a fake!
He made it!
[more controversy : "I s this earth i nvi s ible ?" . • . "You don' t be lieve
it " . . . "No, it 's not " . . . " Us wou ld be fa l ling i n space" .
Eta .]

Dialogue

The discussion takes its own course. On one reading, it is like a powerful,
unbroken horse, whose rider (D.K.?) uses every technique he knows to keep it "on
track." It is almost undoubtedly true that it never would have taken place
without the adult, or at least would not have lasted for more than a few minuteis.
The young child is "young" in just that sense of powerlessness before the task
of what Smith refers to as the "dialectic" of"· . . the inner tension in human
existence between order and disorder, the rational and the bestial. Our task is
to maintain unity of self, integrity, within every threatening disintegration
into boundless chaos" (Gadamer, 1986, p. 122, translator's footnote). To hand l e
this dialectic requires the ancient virtues of phr onesis (reasonableness) and
andrei a (courage), neither of which are childlike virtues. On this reading,
dialogue is always won from the excesses and distortions of fear and desire,
which cast their grotesque projections into the language event like the images
in a distorting mirror.
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On another, not necessaril y incompatible reading, the discussion "takes its
own course," not towards chaos and entropy, but as the unfolding of an inherent
reason in existence, through the "logic of question and answer." This is another
sort of dialectic, a self-unfolding re-presentation (a "play") of existence in
i ts truth, through the playfulness of dialogue. Gadamer calls this "philosophical dialectic," which, he says, "presents the whole of truth, in the selfcancellation of all partial propositions by bringing contradictions to a head and
overcoming them" (1975, p. 429). For this dialectic, the immanent, gui ding telos
is the "exigence of reason for unity" (1982, p. 19), an inexorable movement of
existence towards the revelation of a totality of meaning.3 Philosophical
dialectic functions, "not as a methodic activity of the subject, but as something
whi ch the thing i tself does, and which thought 'suffers.'" In the lived language
event, "this act i vity of the thing itself is the real speculative movement that
takes hold of the speaker" (Gadamer, 1975, p. 431).
What is revealing about being present with young children at this event of
"suffering" the emergence of meaning is the dramatic clarity of its unfolding.
Here, the awesome skill of Socrates cannot fool us into taking the dialectic of
dialogue as merely a product of technique. Here we find it, so to speak, in
nature. Gadamer describes its logical structure as simultaneous synopsis ( seeing
things together as one) and dihaire sis (division, or differentiation) (1986,
p. 19). Nathan, for example, even in the very midst of a joke rapidly mushrooming in Brad's hands (p. 19), followed by a disciplinary incident, fields a
s ynopsis : the connections between snow and dinosaurs and origins hit him with
everything, from nowhere, in no order. Then di hairesis begins--between the
comet and dinosaurs, between humans and dinosaurs, between different eras of
humanity. The dihairesi s of this section then requires further synopsis --a
pulling of "cavemen," "Egypts," "Indians," and "people" together in their vari ous
relationships, and putting them all on a grand time line.
There are two really striking things about this process. One is how its
dynamic structure proceeds so smoothly through the agon of continuing contradiction, restatement, affirmation, and contradiction. Another, which is made even
more dramatic by the fact that these children don't have a great deal of information to work with, is how this is a process, not only of the emergent
self-clarification of the subject matter, but of collective negotiation of the
proaess itsel f by the participants.
Nathan (the innovator) has tacit knowledge that his brainstorming is partial
and provisional, in need of dihaire s is , requiring others in order to emerge and
be clarified. This makes him willing to ride out conflict, to negotiate his
insights with others . Negotiation is how these children preside over, or assist
at, the emergence of the subject matter through the logic of question and answer.
Negotiation is the fundamental modality of language as a mediative structure,
as conversati on.
Negotiation is the heart of dialogue, in that it is a way of being ma i eutically i n the language event, of allowing one's particular perspective to be
transformed by the dialectic of dialogue. I.n the "communion in which we do not
remain what we were," the order of meaning emerges in concrete, contingent
situation through negotiation. But this is not to say either that truth is a
negotiated, collective construct, or that negotiation is a sort of therapeutic
ideal; that, for example, the "self-actualized" person has attained to "negotiation," and could bring the order of meaning into every contingency ( if only
everyone else were also an adept).
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On the contrary, negotiation can be dangerous. Our text can also be read
as a story of dialogue breaking down. Nor is such ambiguity abnormal to the
dialectic of dialogue. Socrates often drives his interlocutors away, and many
of his dialogues end with a pervasive sense of aporia, of puzzlement. In this
text, we see fear and desire almost systematically distorting the communicative
process, and threatening dialogue. This is especially clear in Sara, who is so
compulsively determined to "achieve" at what she understands as a teacher-led
game (which in fact it is, but not of the kind she has already, at age five,
come to expect) that she sows rivalry, discord, and unpleasant absurdity through
the event. Her presence is felt and read as anti-dialogical, in that she tends
to direct her dynamic energies, not towards the emergent, negotiated truth of
the matter, but towards self--personal performance, recognition, and control-which interferes with her ability to think or react with much clarity or order.
But Sara is not the villain of this piece. The qualities that she shows
forth as if larger than life, everyone shares. Her struggle with the "inner
tension between order and disorder, the rational and the bestial" is simply more
dramatically offset, as if projected onto a larger screen. For all anyone
knows, she is fated to learn to deal with that tension more effectively than the
others. Rather, the sense of breakdown reflects both the ideological diversity
of the participants' families--the tension between the deep-cultural assumptional
sets that each child already carries--and the perilous nature of the dialogical
itself. The stakes are always high if the dialogue is real, for fear and desire
construe the "suffering" of dialogue as a form of self-loss. Letting "the
activity of the thing itself" "take hold" of one promises a kind of death. A
"communion in which we do not remain what we were" is a frightening spectre to
the self-protective ego. But as Sara's role in the text implies, the principle
of self-aggrandizement is not compatible with the principle of unity of self,
of integrity; rather, it calls forth "disintegration into boundless chaos," th€i
war of the all against the all, which includes the self's perverse and subtle
war against itself.
Dialogue is not always easy, natural, or therapeutic. The dialectic of
dialogue, where things speak themselves, is won through "holding to one definite
thing within threatening indeterminacy." This movement is, on Gadamer's account,
the dialectic of human life itself, which "at every moment is itself and,
exactly for that reason, separated from itself" (Gadamer, 1986, p. 122). But
this is an ontological mystery of which it is difficult to speak.
Sara:
Nathan:
Penny:
Peter:
Joana:
Nathan:
Peter:
Nathan:

Maisy:
Penny:

David! David! They say if you don't believe in God you go to the uh
. • • De vil.
[after a sli ght -pa.use} Devi l not real.
Devil's not true, Sara!
Yahl
Yes it is. If the Devil-No it's not, man!
Yahl If the Devil was true, what'd the earth be? Nothing but a smoking
crater!
If you lied one time you would go down. And I lied one time, and I
didn't go down . . . . I had a been dead by now. I would be dead by
now.
[aontroversy and aonfusion of voiaes is s t eadily growing i n int ensity}
It is a real Devil. It is not fake!
It is not, it's fake.
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Sara:
Penny:
Sara:
Joana:
Penny:
Sara:
Penny:
Maisy:
Nathan:
Maisy:
Brad:
Sara:
Nathan:
Brad:
Nathan:
Penny:
Sara:
Peter:
Penny:
Joana:
D.K.:
Joana:
Brad:
D.K.:
Penny:
Maisy:
Brad:
D.K.:
Penny:
D.K.:
Sara:
D.K.:
Alan:
Sara:
D.K.:
Sara:

Brad:
Penny:
D.K.:
Nathan:
Peter:
Penny:
Sara:
D.K.:
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It is not.
Yes it is, Sara!
No it's not!
It's real.
It is too, it's fake.
No it's not, you're just trying to go down to the Devil.
No I'm not! It's only fake.
Scott [her older brother] has one at his
. . at his school sometimes.
Fake! Hey Devil! I know what you got. I no got a voice . . • I no
got a voice • . •
He is real.
There is the devil, I know that.
I seen the Devil in a Bible, and on Sunday • . . [drowned out]
I no got a voice Devil, so kill me! Kill me!
It says in the
. • um . . . in the Bible that there is a real Devil.
Uh uh!
There is not! It's only a fake!
I saw a real devil in my Bible!
It's not real.
It's only a fake.
I saw the Devil.
Huh? You saw him, you say?
Yah, a real big one.
If the Bible says there's a Devil in it then . . . there are 'cause
. Jesus wrote that.
Ah. So if the Bible • . • You're taking the word of the Bible.
No! There's only a fake. It's only a fake.
It is not!
[more shouting lxiak and forth]
The Holy Bible has a . . • reading of the Devil, and Jesus wrote that.
Oh. The Holy Bible-Still fake!
So you're saying that if it's in the Bible then it's true.
In my Bible I saw what the Devil really looks like, I did.
How was that?
What did he look like?
He was all red, he had blood all over him, he had horns, he had hooves
• . • he just looked so gross!
Was it a photograph, or a painting, or-It was a photograph. Somebody that saw him. But you know what? In
that Bible it told me that the Devil is real. And he can come for you
when you're dead, and get you when you never believe in God . • • Or God
will drive you down.
I believe in God.
I don't! . . . I don't believe in God.
Joana?
I believe in God!
Everyone believes in God.
I don't believe it. There's no such thing as God!
[four people are talking at onae . Penny is still insisting passionately,
"It's just a fake." Alan starts making mooing noises. J
David, can we go outside? My stomach is getting runny.
Yes. We'll just have a couple minutes, but-fall move quiakly outside, exaept for Alan, who rises but does not leave]

Alan:

D.K.:

Alan:
D.K.:

Alan:

Hey David, David ! I saw this kind of devil. And this devil was sittin'
on a court thing, and he didn't . . . he just had hands • . . and dogs
. devil dogs • . . and then he said . . • and then he pushed that
. that man, you know that was standing beside him, into the devil
dog and they ate, and they bited him he go "Yow!" and he just went out .
Oh. Was this on a cartoon?
Yah.
Oh.
[now leaving to go outs ide, making little screams, like the cartoon man
who l.<Xls bitten ] Yow! Yow ! Yow! Yow!

Replication

I have already pointed out that the text can be read as a drama of contemporary life. Young children are putt i ng on a play about the adult world--with
the help, of course, of an adult, who provides key elements of the script. But
what are the key elements of the plot as a whole?
There is, for one, an argument go i ng on about knowledge. How can one know
the true story ? What are the authorities ? Anna claims TV, the wisdom of
extreme old age, and her mother; Sara and Peter, many books; Brad, Penny (at
first), and Joana, revelation; Maisy, local custom and her brother; and Nathan,
empirical testing. Alan, the bemused dreamer, never claims anything. In the
final encounter, the implicit dissonance between these various author ities is
compressed into a searing confrontation between revelation/belief and empiricism/
common sense, which divides the group almost equally in half.
The argument about knowledge is really an argument about belief, or first
principles. These young children are replicating, not just the atmosphere, but
the fundamental content of the ideological conflict (often identified by the
euphemistic term "pluralism") which is a prominent feature of late twentieth
century American cultural experience. The dramatic about-face of Penny exemplifies the ambivalence of a culture which has moved from a confessing Christian to
a radically naturalistic metaphysic within a short one hundred years.
There seems to be a complicated social process going on, in which the
relative authority that each person carries in the group is delicately weighed
in the negotiation, before sides are finally taken, and an impasse reached.
Nathan, for example, first raises the question of God, in usual brainstorming
fashion (p. 24), but is ignored. He raises it again--"God--God just knows
everything" (p. 26)--after Sara's demoralizing monologue. Then, in that tired
silence, it is heard, upon which things heat up and maintain at fever pitch
until the end.
Penny first affirms Nathan's introduction of God (p. 26). Then Peter, a
six-year-old who is generally recognized as having a closer-to-adult version of
things, protests ("Hey!", p. 26), and raises a logical problem about the deity
of Jesus. Penny persists, but then Nathan raises another, even deeper question
--the question of how we know the story about God at all. He seems to be
responding to his own earlier statement, which started the whole thing. At thi s
Penny switches, and from here on presents a united front with Nathan and Peter,
and, when they back down some (p. 27), against them as well. In the course of
things, she has moved from arguing that "He knows everything" (p. 26), to "I
don't believe in a God" (p. 27), to "It's only a fake!" (pp. 27, 29-30), with
increasing passion.
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What is being replicated here is a climate of belief in which philosophical
scept i cism has final authority. Religious belief is treated as a falsifiable
hypothesis--that is, as a proposition that can be treated like any other scientif i c hypothesis. This, as Whittaker (1981), in an analysis of this very
phenomenon, says, "makes affirmations of religious faith look like guesswork . "
He goes on:

Philosophiaal saepti ai sm does not deri ve i t s fo rae from any par tiaular
reason for doubt ; it draws its strengt h f r om the general possibilities
o f error and the abs traat possibi l ity of findi ng new reasons for doubting old truths . How aan we be abso l ut ely sure of what we know a s long
as suah possibi l itie s exi s t ? That i s t he probl em. (p. 12)
This is Peter's and Nathan's game.
On a deeper level, what is being replicated is a confusion between two
different language fames, or two different orders of truth claims--the religious
and the scientific.
For the naturalistic metaphysics of science, every event
has a cause; therefore, any first cause must be within nature. But a first
cause within nature is unthinkable. For religious thought this is not really
even an issue, for the quest i on of God belongs outside the "logical space" of
contingency. Its prime premise is completely anti-naturalistic. "God does not
belong to the class of existing things: not that He has no existence, but that
He is above all existing things, nay even above existence itself" (Losky, 1957,
p. 36). 5
Relig i ous principles assume the non-contingency, the meaningful purpose and
order, and the intelligibility of the universe as foundational. These assumptions are what Wittgenstein (1972) called "certainties." When certainties are
reassessed as hypotheses, the whole structure of tacit judgments which grounds
them is weakened. Anomalies in the "ideal of explicability" proliferate.
Finally, a new ideal of explicability moves into place, by which the old ideal
is held up to scrutiny (Whittaker, 1981).
This story--the story of a crisis in the Western ideal of explicability--is
what the text is tel li ng. It is what the children are playing. What is extraordinary is the degree to which they have internalized its basic plot. Beyond
that, they do not carry the story further (although they may yet--it depends to
some extent on pedagogy), but ritualize it with unerring dramatic sense. In
the hands of their unconscious mastery, it takes on the haunting, antiphonal
automaticity of ancient theatre, with its fatal instinct for the truth.
Conclusions

I must repeat that this text could be read differently: as a failed exercise in communicative competence, for example, or as a struggle between teacher
and students; as a sociological printout, or a printout of cognitive stage; as
an example of i deological formation, or an exercise in singing the world through
the precise rhythm-play of pitch and juncture; and so forth. Different interpretive approaches call forth different essences. This must be so, for the
essences are eminently temporal and relational, and only come to light through
interpretation.
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The essences, however, are no less universal for all that. The point is
that whenever we touch the concrete immediate in its integrity there is a revelation of the essential. It is the abstract--ta mathemata (Heidegger, 1977a,
pp. 267-269)--which opposes itself to the concrete, not the universal or essential. This is what precludes any technique or technology of the reading of
essences which would attempt to reduce the interpretive function to an equation
based on statistical probability. It also precludes the sort of systematic
ideological agenda, equally abstract, which grounds interpretation on a dramatically oversimplified semantical universe like "critical-rational-hegemonydomination-emancipation-resistance." Rather, each reading carries the peculiar
concrete way of living the universal of each interpreter, on a structural level
beneath (if never entirely free of) "interest," and its reification in ideology
or technique. The essences emerge when the interpreter is led by the activity
of the thing itself.
What surprises me about this reading is discovering how young children and
adults, in spite of apparent differences, tend to approach fundamental things in
the same way. If anything, young children show forth the fundamentals more
clearly than adults, because they tend to "play" things--or, rather, allow
themselves to be played, to be mastered by things, to be drawn into the collective language event in its spontaneous representat i on of the world.6 This would
not surprise me, of course, if I were not prey to the "natural attitude," which
interprets the apparent differences between adults and children as more radical
than they essentially are, and no doubt carries analogous exaggerative distortions of perspective when interpreting their similarities.
The elements of attention and surprise that come with such momentary breaks
in the natural attitude are essential to responsible pedagogy. This i s especially important because the pedagogue's role is to produce tension in children-not a fruitless tension, but a tension that calls for and allows the response of
noetic (and therefore psychic) enlargement, articulation, and synthesis. But a
teacher who is continually in the natural attitude, and who never experiences a
reversal of consciousness before the child, can foster a different kind of
tension--one which is fruitless and negative, and which makes children hate
school. Children can become a sort of natural enemy to adults who no longer
look to them for that "moment of negativity" which is a moment of truth. This
is not to say that pedagogues and children are not often in conflict; but their
conflict should result in the "blessed wounds of a friend," and not bitter
generational animosity.
Looking for the break in the natural attitude is not peculiar to the adultchild relationship. It is true of any relationship which is not turning bad or
standing still. It is the ground-stance of dialogue. It takes, however, a
unique form in the relationship between teacher and child, who face each other
from radically different places in the life cycle, and operate in relatively
distinct temporal, perceptual, and noetic modes. To call one merely more or
less than, or on the way to, or a later form of the other, is to mask the lived
experience of difference with mere explanations, however true in one sense they
may be. It is this lived experience that this text has preserved, if in a
ghostly fashion. It is lived experience that pedagogues need somehow to capture
and reflect upon, if they are to grow in their practice.
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Notes

l 11 To the extent that in spoken discourse the illocutionary force depends
upon mimicry and gesture, and upon the nonarticulated aspects of discourse, which
we call prosody, it must be acknowledged that the illocutionary force is less
inscribable than the propositional meaning. Finally, the perlocutionary act is
the least inscribable aspect of discourse • . . " (Ricoeur, 1976, p. 27).
2Note that Brad, whose silliness I thought was threatening the discussion,
was back on p. 30 for the discussion about God. He had stuck his head in at the
door, and I had motioned him to return.
3rt is arguable that this drive for unity is present in a demonic form in
war, whose inherent dialectic results in the totality of M.A.D. (Mutually
Assured Destruction).
4This is putting it mildly. The confusion can be--and increasingly is-interpreted as the result of epistemological imperialism on science's part. For
example: "The point of confrontation between science and religion is not any one
theory. It is, rather, the extension of scientific metatheoretical assumptions
to a point of dominion over all other metatheoretical assumptions about the
world" (Stanley, 1978, p. 17).
5Losky is quoting St. John Damascene. He also quotes St. Gregory Palamas:
"For if God be nature then all else is not nature. If that which is not God be
nature, God is not nature, and likewise He is not being if that which is not God
is being" (p. 37).
6Gadamer: "[Play's] mode of being is self-representation . . . self-representation is a universal aspect of the being of nature" (1975, p. 97).
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